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11 Introduction
In seminal papers, Radner (1979) and Allen (1981) prove the generic existence of a
rational expectations equilibrium (REE). Indeed, Kreps (1977) provides an example
that shows that REE may not exist universally. However, a careful examination
of Krep's example of the nonexistence of the REE indicates that there is nothing
wrong with the REE concept other than the fact that we impose on agents the
Bayesian (subjective expected utility) decision doctrine. We show that replacing
the Bayesian expected utility by the maximin expected utility (MEU) leads to a
REE which turns out to be ecient and incentive compatible in Kreps's example.
This poses the following questions that we will address in this paper:
Why should one dictate a priori a Bayesian expected utility maximization? Does
the replacement of the Bayesian doctrine with the MEU provide better outcomes?
Does the REE exist universally under the MEU decision making? Is it ecient
and incentive compatible? The Bayesian and the MEU formulations provide two
dierent expected utility functional forms; is the MEU formulation superior to the
Bayesian?
We introduce a new notion of REE which abandons the Bayesian decision mak-
ing adopted in the papers of Radner (1979) and Allen (1981). Under the Bayesian
decision making, agents maximize their subjective expected utilities conditioned on
their own private information and also on the information that the equilibrium prices
generate. The resulting equilibrium allocations are measurable with respect to the
private information of each individual and also with respect to the information the
equilibrium prices generate and clear the market for every state of nature.
Our non-expected utility reformulation of the rational expectations equilibrium
of Radner (1979) and Allen (1981) is based on the adoption of the MEU (see Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989)). Specically, in our new setup agents maximize their MEU
conditioned on their own private information and also on the information the equi-
librium prices have generated. In this setting the resulting maximin REE may
not be measurable with respect to the private information of each individual and
also with respect to the information that the equilibrium prices generate (contrary
to the Bayesian REE). Nonetheless, market clearing occurs for every state of nature.
An attempt to introduce non-expected utility into general equilibrium theory
was previously made by de Castro-Yannelis (2008). Specically, de Castro-Yannelis
(2008) showed that by replacing the Bayesian (subjective expected utility) by the
2maximin expected utility, the conict between eciency and incentive compatibil-
ity ceases to exist. In this paper, we continue this line of research by introducing
non-expected utility into the rational expectations equilibrium.
The introduction of the MEU into the general equilibrium modeling, enables us
to prove that the maximin REE exists universally under the standard continuity
and concavity assumptions of the utility function. Furthermore, we show that the
maximin REE is incentive compatible and ecient. These results are false for the
Bayesian REE (see Kreps (1977) and Glycopantis-Yannelis (2005), p.31 and also
Example 9.1.1, p.43).
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the notion of max-
imin REE. In Section 3 we compare the maximin REE with the Bayesian REE. In
particular, we show that in the Kreps's example 3.4, where a REE does not exist,
a maximin REE does exist. Section 4 states the assumptions which guarantee the
existence of a maximin REE. Sections 5 and 6 prove the eciency and the incentive
compatibility of the maximin REE. The related literature is discussed in Section
7. Some concluding remarks and open questions are collected in Section 8. The
appendix contains the proof of the existence of the maximin REE.
2 Dierential information economy and maximin
REE
2.1 Dierential information economy
We dene the notion of a nite-agent economy with dierential information. Let

 be the nite set of states of nature and F be an algebra on 
. Let I R`
+ be
the commodity space and I be a set of n agents. A dierential information
exchange economy E is a set
E = f(
;F); (Xi;Fi;ui;ei;i) : i 2 I = f1;:::;ngg;
where for all i 2 I
- Xi : 
 ! 2I R`
+ is agent i'random consumption set of each agent4.
4Throughout the paper, we consider for each i 2 I and ! 2 
, Xi(!) to be the commodity
space, i.e., Xi(!) = I R`
+, expect when additional assumptions on Xi are required.
3- Fi is a measurable partition5 of (
;F) denoting the private information of
agent i. The interpretation is as usual: if ! 2 
 is the state of nature that is
going to be realized, agent i observes EFi(!) the element of Fi which contains
!.
- a random utility function representing her (ex post) preferences:
ui : 
  I R
`
+ ! I R
(!;x) ! ui(!;x):
- a random initial endowment of physical resources represented by the function
ei : 
 ! I R
`
+:
We assume that ei is Fi-measurable and ei(!) 2 Xi(!) for all ! 2 
.
- i is a probability on 
, whose role will be claried below. It is assumed that
i(!) > 0 for all ! 2 
.
The structure above does not describe yet the preference of each agent. In
fact, we will consider two types of preferences: the Bayesian or Expected Utility
(EU) preferences (described in section 2.2 below) and the Maximin Expected Utility
preference (described in section 2.3). The above structure, including each agent's
preference, is common knowledge for all agents.
As usual, we can interpret the above economy as a two time period (t = 1;2)
model, since the ex ante stage (t = 0) does not play a role in rational expectation
theory. At the interim stage, t = 1, agent i only knows that the realized state belongs
to the event EFi(!), where ! is the true state at t = 2. With this information (or
with the information acquired through prices, as we discuss below), agents trade.
At the ex post stage (t = 2), agents execute the trades according to the contract
agreed in period t = 1, and consumption takes place.
We dene a price vector p as a function from 
 to the simplex of I R`
+, denoted
by , such that p() is F-measurable. Notice that since for each !, p(!) 2 , then
p(!) 6= 0. This guarantees that p : 
 !  is a non-zero function.
Dene for each price vector p, the budget set of agent i in state ! as follows:
Bi(!;p(!)) = fyi 2 Xi(!) : p(!)  yi  p(!)  ei(!)g:
5By an abuse of notation we will still denote by Fi the algebra that the partition Fi generates.
4In order to introduce the rational expectation notions in section 3, we need
the following notation. Let (p) be the smallest sub-algebra of F for which p is
measurable and let Gi = Fi _ (p) denote the smallest algebra containing both Fi
and (p).
A function x : I  
 ! I R`
+ is said to be a random consumption vector or
allocation if for each i 2 I and ! 2 
, xi(!) 2 Xi(!). Dene for all i 2 I, the sets
LXi = fxi : 
 ! I R
`
+ : xi(!) 2 Xi(!) for all ! 2 
g;
 LXi = fxi 2 LXi : xi() is Fi measurableg:
 L
REE
Xi = fxi 2 LXi : xi() is Gi measurableg:
Let LX =
Q
i2I LXi,  LX =
Q











ei(!) for all ! 2 
:
2.2 Expected utility (EU)
We dene now the (Bayesian or subjective expected utility) interim expected utility.
For each i, let (
;F;i) be a probability space and i  F be any partition of 
.
For any assignment xi : 
 ! I R`
+, agent i's interim expected utility function




















 for !0 2 Ei(!):












In the applications below, the partition i will be the original partition Fi or,
more frequently, the partition generated by the prices, Gi = Fi _ (p).
52.3 Maximin Expected Utility (MEU)
As before, let i  F be a partition of 
. The maximin utility of each agent i with









Whenever for each agent i the measurable partition i is his private information






On the other hand, when we deal with the notion of rational expectations equi-
librium (according to which agents take into account also the information that the
equilibrium prices generate), then for each agent i the measurable partition i is Gi
and the maximin utility is dened as
u
REE




0)); where Gi = Fi _ (p):
As the reader can see, this corresponds to an interim notion and does not require
any expected utility representation. Therefore, we could have named it only maximin
preference instead of MEU. However, this interim preference may come from an ex
ante MEU, as dened by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), as we clarify below.
2.4 Motivating MEU preferences
We can introduce the MEU preferences dened above in a more intuitive way. For
this, let us consider again the standard Bayesian (subjective expected utility) pref-
erence dened above. Recall that we have assumed that the prior i is dened on F.
What does justify this assumption? This is exactly the central tenet of the Bayesian
paradigm: the agent has a prior about everything that he ignores, that is, a prior
for all !'s. However, the Bayesian paradigm has been the target of many criticisms
and it seems desirable to consider other paradigms. For this, let us make the weaker
assumption that the agent has a prior not over all events, but only about those
events that he can observe, that is, events measurable with respect to the private
information partition Fi. Although this assumption may yet be subject to criticism,
it is a weaker assumption and may be justied on the grounds that each agent, by
observing the occurrence of the events EFi(!), could learn their likelihood.
6Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that i is the prior of each agent i 2 I,
restricted to Fi, the private information of agent i. The ex ante preference o
i of











ui(!;g(!))di for all f;g 2  LXi:
This ex ante preference seems a completely standard EU preference. However,
as de Castro-Yannelis (2008) have noticed, these preferences are incomplete. To see
this, it is sucient to observe that the preferences are capable of comparing only Fi-
measurable allocations. If the allocation h is not Fi-measurable, its integral
R
hdi
is not dened and, therefore, it is not possible for individual i to compare h with
any other allocations. In other words: neither f o
i h nor h o
i f hold for any allo-
cation f, which is the same as saying that the preference o
i is incomplete. As it was
discussed in de Castro-Yannelis (2008), individuals can complete their preferences
by adopting the maximin expected utility (MEU) of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).8
We now recall the formal denition of preferences due to de Castro-Yannelis (2008).
Let P denote the set of measures  : F ! [0;1]. Dene for each i, the following
set
Pi = f 2 P : (A) = i(A); for all A 2 Fig: (1)
Thus, Pi is the set of all extensions of i from Fi to F, that is the set of all
probability measures dened in F that agree with i in the event that individual i
is informed about. We now consider the preference i which extends o
i from  LXi
to the set of all allocations, LXi, i.e.,










ui(!;g(!))d for all f;g 2 LXi: (2)
The preferences i are complete. De Castro and Yannelis (2008) have proved
6We use the notation o
i instead of the more standard i for a reason that will become clear
in a moment.
7In this section, we will consider only ex ante preferences. The natural interim counterpart
of the ex ante maximin expected utility preference dened here is the maximin utility dened on
section 2.3.
8 We will actually consider a special case of Gilboa-Schmeidler's preference: the one with the
richest set of possible priors. De Castro-Yannelis (2008) show that this specialization is important:
other preferences do not have the same incentive-compatibility property. See details in that paper.
7that the preferences i given by (2) can be equivalently characterized by:

















0))di for all f;g 2 LXi:
When we are interested in the notion of rational expectation equilibrium, we
need to change expression (1) since agents take into account also the information
that the equilibrium prices generate, Gi = Fi _ (p). Therefore, Pi dened in (1)
must be replaced by9
P
REE
i = f 2 P : (A) = i(A); for all A 2 Gig: (3)
Thus, PREE
i is the set of all extensions of i from Gi to F, that is the set of all
probability measure dened in F that agree with i in the events that individual i
is informed about. Then, we consider the preference REE
i which extends o
i from
 LREE
Xi to the set of all allocations, LXi, i.e.,
f 
REE












ui(!;g(!))d for all f;g 2 LXi:
Similarly to (2) observe that the preferences REE
i given by the above expression




















0))di for all f;g 2 LXi:
Now, as we said before, the interim specialization of this preference corresponds
to the maximin utility dened on section 2.3.
3 Maximin REE vs the Bayesian REE
3.1 Rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
Recall that (p) is the smallest sub-algebra of F for which p is measurable and
Gi = Fi _ (p) denotes the smallest algebra containing both Fi and (p). We shall
9Note that this denition requires i to be dened on Gi instead of just Fi. However, the
justication (based on learning) given above for i being dened on Fi also works for Gi.
8also condition the expected utility of the agents on Gi which produces a random
variable. The notion below is due to Radner (1979) and Allen (1981).
Denition 3.1 A price vector p and a feasible allocation x are said to be a rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) for the economy E if
(i) for all i the allocation xi() is Gi-measurable;
(ii) for all i and for all !, xi(!) 2 Bi(!;p(!));
(iii) for all i and for all !, xi maximizes the interim expected utility function
vi(xijGi)(!) subject to Bi(!;p(!)).
Remark 3.2 Since, the REE is an interim solution concept, one should expect that


















p(!)  xi(!)  p(!)  ei(!): (5)
However, we show that (4) and (5) are equivalent. Indeed, since Gi = Fi_(p), then
p() is Gi-measurable for all i 2 I, as well as xi() (see condition (i)). Furthermore,
since for all i 2 I, ei() is Fi-measurable and Fi  Gi, then ei() is Gi-measurable.

















= p(!)  ei(!):
This means that (4) is equivalent to (5).
The REE is an interim concept since agents maximize conditional expected utility
based on their own private information and also on the information that equilibrium
prices have generated. The resulting allocation clears the market for every state of
nature.
9It is by now well known that a rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as
introduced in Radner (1979) may not exist. It only exists in a generic sense and
not universal. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible
and it is not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form
game (Glycopantis-Muir-Yannelis (2005)).
3.2 Maximin REE
We now dene the notion of a maximin REE.
Denition 3.3 A price vector p and a feasible allocation x are said to be a max-
imin rational expectations equilibrium (MREE) for the economy E if:
(i) for all i and for all ! the allocation xi(!) 2 Bi(!;p(!));
(ii) for all i 2 I and for all ! 2 
, uREE

















Conditions (i) and (ii) indicate that each individual maximizes her maximin
expected utility conditioned on her private information and the information the
equilibrium prices have generated, subject to the budget constraint.
A free disposal REE or maximin REE is dened as before, except that the






ei(!) for all ! 2 
:
Either a REE or a maximin REE are said to be (i) fully revealing if the price
function reveals to each agent all states of nature, (ii) partially revealing if the price
function reveals some but not all states of nature.
3.3 Relationship between the maximin REE and the Bayesian
REE
We now show that the notions of maximin REE and of REE seem to be not com-
parable as the following example (due to Kreps (1977)) indicates. In particular, in
10the Kreps's example, which proves that the REE does not exist, we will show that a
maximin REE does exist. From this we can conclude that maximin REE and REE
are two dierent solution concepts.
Example 3.4 There10 are two agents, two commodities and two equally probable
states of nature 



































The utility functions of agents 1 and 2 in states !1 and !2 are given as follows
u1(!1;x1;y1) = logx1 + y1 u1(!2;x1;y1) = 2logx1 + y1
u2(!1;x2;y2) = 2logx2 + y2 u2(!2;x2;y2) = logx2 + y2:
It is well known that for the above economy a rational expectations equilibrium
does not exist (see Kreps (1977)), however we will show below that a maximin REE
does exist.
The information generated by the equilibrium price can be either ff!1g;f!2gg
or ff!1;!2gg. In the rst case the maximin REE coincides with the Bayesian
REE, therefore it does not exist. Thus, let us consider the case (p) = 
, i.e.,
p(!1) = p(!2) = p and q(!1) = q(!2) = q.
Since for each !, EG1(!) = f!g, agent 1 solves the following constraint maxi-
mization problems:
Agent 1 in state !1:
max
x1(!1);y1(!1)
logx1(!1) + y1(!1) subject to


















Agent 1 in state !2:
max
x1(!2);y1(!2)
2logx1(!2) + y1(!2) subject to

















Agent 2 in the event f!1;!2g maximizes
minf2logx2(!1) + y2(!1);logx2(!2) + y2(!2)g:
Therefore, we can distinguish three cases:
I Case: 2logx2(!1) + y2(!1) > logx2(!2) + y2(!2). In this case, agent 2 solves
the following constraint maximization problem:
max logx2(!2) + y2(!2) subject to px2(!1) + qy2(!1)  3
2(p + q) and px2(!2) +
qy2(!2)  3













From feasibility it follows that p = q, and
(x1(!1);y1(!1)) = (1;2) (x1(!2);y1(!2)) = (2;1)
(x2(!1);y2(!1)) = (2;1) (x2(!2);y2(!2)) = (1;2):
Notice that 2logx2(!1) + y2(!1) = 2log2 + 1 > log1 + 2 = logx2(!2) + y2(!2).
II Case: 2logx2(!1)+y2(!1) < logx2(!2)+y2(!2). In this case, agent 2 solves
the following constraint maximization problem:
max 2logx2(!1)+y2(!1) subject to px2(!1)+qy2(!1)  3
2(p+q) and px2(!2)+
qy2(!2)  3













12From feasibility it follows that p = q, and
(x1(!1);y1(!1)) = (1;2) (x1(!2);y1(!2)) = (2;1)
(x2(!1);y2(!1)) = (2;1) (x2(!2);y2(!2)) = (1;2):
Clearly, as noticed above, 2log2 + 1 > log1 + 2. Therefore, in the second case
there is no maximin REE.
III Case: 2logx2(!1) + y2(!1) = logx2(!2) + y2(!2). In this case, agent 2
solves one of the following two constraint maximization problems:
max logx2(!2)+y2(!2) or max 2logx2(!1)+y2(!1) subject to px2(!1)+qy2(!1) 
3
2(p + q) and px2(!2) + qy2(!2)  3
2(p + q). In both cases, from feasibility it follows
that p = q, and
(x1(!1);y1(!1)) = (1;2) (x1(!2);y1(!2)) = (2;1)
(x2(!1);y2(!1)) = (2;1) (x2(!2);y2(!2)) = (1;2):
Hence, since 2logx2(!1) + y2(!1) = 2log2 + 1 > log1 + 2 = logx2(!2) + y2(!2),
there is no maximin REE in the third case.
Therefore, we can conclude that the unique maximin REE allocation is given by
(x1(!1);y1(!1)) = (1;2) (x1(!2);y1(!2)) = (2;1)
(x2(!1);y2(!1)) = (2;1) (x2(!2);y2(!2)) = (1;2):
Observe that the maximin REE bundles are not Fi-measurable.
Remark 3.5 It should be noted that in the above example whenever agents max-
imize a Bayesian (subjective) expected utility as Kreps showed, the REE either
revealing or non revealing does not exist. However, allowing agents to maximize a
non expected utility, i.e., the maximin expected utility, we showed that a maximin
REE exists. The example makes clear that the Bayesian choice of optimization
seems to impose a functional restriction on the utility functions which does not
allow agents to achieve the desired outcome. The functional form of the maximin
expected utility seems to be achieving what we want agents to accomplish, i.e., to
reach an equilibrium outcome. As we will see in the next section, this outcome is
incentive compatible and ecient.
13Remark 3.6 As we have already observed the maximin REE allocations may not be
Gi-measurable. However, if we assume strict concavity and Fi-measurability of the
random utility function of each agent, then the resulting maximin REE allocations
will be Gi- measurable, as the following proposition indicates.
Proposition 3.7 Let (p;x) be a maximin REE and Gi = Fi _ (p) for all i 2 I.
Assume that for all i, (i) ui(;y) is Gi-measurable for all y 2 I R`
+ and (ii) ui(!;) is
strictly concave for all ! 2 
. Then xi() is Gi-measurable for all i 2 I.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that there exist i 2 I and a;b 2 
 such that
a 2 EGi(b) and xi(a) 6= xi(b). Consider zi(!) = xi(a) + (1   )xi(b) for all
! 2 EGi(b), where  2 (0;1), and notice that zi() is Gi-measurable. Moreover,
u
REE




ui(!;xi(a) + (1   )xi(b))
Since ui(;y) is Gi-measurable for all y 2 I R`




i (b;zi) = ui(b;xi(a) + (1   )xi(b)) > ui(b;xi(a)) + (1   )ui(b;xi(b))
= ui(a;xi(a)) + (1   )ui(b;xi(b))  u
REE
i (b;xi):
Since (p;x) is a maximin REE it follows that zi = 2 B
i (b;p), that is there exists a
state !i 2 EGi(b) such that
p(!i)  zi(!i) > p(!i)  ei(!i) ) p(!i)  xi(a) + (1   )p(!i)  xi(b) > p(!i)  ei(!i):
Moreover, since p() and ei() are Gi-measurable and xi(!) 2 Bi(!;p(!)) for all !
(see condition (i) in Denition 3.3), it follows that p()  ei() > p()  ei(), which is
a contradiction. 
It was shown in Example 3.4 that the maximin and the Bayesian REE are
not comparable. We will show below that whenever the utility functions are Fi-
measurable, then any maximin REE is also a REE and vice versa. Note that in
Example 3.4, utility functions are not Fi-measurable and therefore Example 3.4
does not fulll the assumptions of Lemma 3.8 below.
Lemma 3.8 Assume that for all i 2 I and for all y 2 I R`
+, ui(;y) is Fi-measurable.
If (p;x) is a REE, then (p;x) is a maximin REE. The converse is also true if xi()
is Gi-measurable for all i 2 I.
14Proof: All we need to show is that the maximin expected utility and the interim
expected utility coincide. Since for all i 2 I and for all y 2 I R`
+, ui(;y) is Fi-
measurable and Fi  Gi, then ui(;y) is Gi-measurable.
Moreover, since for each i 2 I, xi() is Gi-measurable it follows that for all i 2 I
and ! 2 
, both maximin and interim utility function are equal to the ex-post
















From (6) and (7) it follows that for all i and !, ui(!;xi) = vi(xijGi)(!). There-
fore, we can conclude that (p;x) is a maximin REE if and only if (p;x) is a Bayesian
REE. 
Remark 3.9 The above lemma remains true if we replace the Fi-measurability of
the allocations by the strict concavity of the random utility functions. This follows
by combining Proposition 3.7 and Lemma 3.8.
4 Existence of a Maximin REE
In this section we prove the existence of a maximin REE. It should be noted that
under the assumptions, which guarantee that a maximin REE exists, the Bayesian
REE need not exist. The following assumptions are needed:
(A:1) For every i 2 I and ! 2 
, Xi(!) is a non-empty, convex and closed
subset of I R`
+;
(A:2) For every i 2 I and ! 2 
, the initial endowment ei(!) belongs to the
interior of Xi(!);
15(A:3) For every i 2 I and ! 2 
, the function ui(!;) is continuous, concave
and strongly monotone.
Theorem 4.1 (Main Existence Theorem) : Assume that assumptions (A:1);(A:2)
and (A:3) hold, then there exists a maximin REE in E:
The following auxiliary theorem plays an important role in the proof of Theorem
4.1. The proofs of both theorems are in the appendix.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that assumptions (A:1);(A:2) and (A:3) hold and that for
every i 2 I and ! 2 
, Xi(!) is a compact set. Then, a free disposal maximin REE
exists.
4.1 Proof of the main existence theorem
For k 2 I N, i 2 I and ! 2 
, let Xk













Assumption (A.1) implies that Xk
i (!) is compact and convex; while assumption
(A.2) guarantees that it is also non empty for all k. Therefore, by the Auxiliary
Theorem 4.2 it follows that for every k, there exists a free disposal maximin REE,
i.e., there exists a sequence (pk;xk) 2 LXk  L4, where for all i 2 I,
LXk
i = fxi : 
 ! I R
`
+ : xi(!) 2 X
k







L = fp : 
 !  such that p() is F   measurableg;
16such that for all k 2 I N,








































ei(!) for all ! 2 
:
Since for any i and k 2 I N, the sequence (pk;xk) belongs to the compact set LLXk,
there exists a subsequence, still denoted by (pk;xk), which converges11 to (p;x).
We need to prove that (p;x) is a maximin REE. First of all, notice that p 2 L
and x 2 LX; moreover from (ik) and (iiik) it follows that for every i 2 I and
! 2 
, x





i2I ei(!), which actually becomes





























Assume, on the contrary, that there exist i 2 I,  ! 2 
 and yi 2 LXi such that
uREE
i ( !;yi) > uREE
i ( !;x
i) and p(!)  yi(!)  p(!)  ei(!) for all ! 2 EGi( !).
By the continuity of the maximin expected utility function and assumption (A:2),
without loss of generality we may consider an allocation yi such that
p
(!)  yi(!) < p
(!)  ei(!) for all ! 2 E
Gi( !): (8)
By continuity of the maximin expected utility function, there exists  k such that
for all k >  k, uREE
i ( !;yi) > uREE
i ( !;xk
i). Since for all k, (pk;xk) is a free disposal
maximin REE, from (iik) it follows that for all k >  k, there exists !k 2 EGi( !) such
that
p
k(!k)  yi(!k) > p
k(!k)  ei(!k):









 is nite, we may conclude that there exists ! 2 EGi( !) such that for innitely
many k 2 I N,
p
k(!)  yi(!) > p
k(!)  ei(!):
Therefore, by limit arguments,
p
(!)  yi(!)  p
(!)  ei(!);
which contradicts (8). Thus, (p;x) is a maximin REE and this completes the
proof. 
Remark 4.3 Assume that assumptions (A:1);(A:2) and (A:3) hold. If for all y 2
I R`
+ and for all i 2 I, ui(;y) is Fi-measurable and ui(!;) is strict concave, then
from Remark 3.9 and Theorem 4.1 it follows that there exists a REE in E: .
Remark 4.4 Notice that in Example 3.4, where the REE does not exist, not all
the above assumptions of Remark 4.3 are satised. In particular, the random utility
functions are not Fi-measurable. Hence, the Kreps's example of the nonexistence of
a REE does not contradict Remark 4.3.
5 Eciency of the maximin REE
We now dene the notion of maximin Pareto optimality and we will prove that any
maximin REE is maximin Pareto optimal.
Denition 5.1 A feasible allocation x is said to be maximin ecient (or maximin
Pareto optimal) with respect to information structure , if there do not exist a state
 ! and an allocation y 2 LX such that
(i) u
i
i ( !;yi) > u
i







ei(!) for all ! 2 
:
Proposition 5.2 If for any i 2 I, and t 2 R`
+, ui(;t) is Fi-measurable12, then any
maximin REE allocation is maximin ecient.
12Notice that the measurability assumption of the utility does not imply that the maximin utility
coincides with the ex post one, since the allocation may not be measurable.
18Proof: Let (p;x) be a maximin REE and notice that since agents take into account
the information that the equilibrium price have generated, then the private informa-
tion of each agent is Gi = Fi _ (p). Thus, for each i 2 I, i = Gi and u
i = uREE
i .
Assume to the contrary that x is not maximin ecient, that is, there exist a state
 ! and an allocation y 2 LX such that
(i) u
REE
i ( !;yi) > u
REE







ei(!) for all ! 2 
:
From condition (i) it follows that for all i 2 I, yi = 2 B
i ( !;p), that is there exists
a state !i 2 EGi( !) such that p(!i)  yi(!i) > p(!i)  ei(!i). Consider, the coalition
S dened as follows:
S = fi 2 I : p( !)  yi( !)  p( !)  ei( !)g:








which contradicts condition (ii). On the other hand, if S 6= ;, then for all i 2 S,
consider the constant allocation hi such that hi(!) = yi( !) for all ! 2 EGi( !).
Since p() and ei() are Gi-measurable, it follows that hi(!) 2 Bi(!;p(!)) for all
! 2 EGi( !), that is hi 2 B
i ( !;p), and hence
u
REE
i ( !;hi)  u
REE
i ( !;xi) < u
REE
i ( !;yi);
because (p;x) is a maximin REE. Moreover, since ui(;y) is Gi-measurable, it follows
that
ui( !;yi( !)) = ui(!;yi( !)) = u
REE
i ( !;hi) < u
REE
i ( !;yi)  ui( !;yi( !));
which is clearly a contradiction. Thus, x is maximin ecient. 
6 Incentive Compatibility of the maximin REE
We now recall the notion of coalitional incentive compatibility of Krasa-Yannelis
(1994).
19Denition 6.1 An allocation x is said to be coalitional incentive compatible (CIC)




Fi(b) for all i = 2 S;
(ii) ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b) 2 I R
`
+ for all i 2 S; and
(iii) ui(a;ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b)) > ui(a;xi(a)) for all i 2 S:
In order to explain what incentive compatibility means in an asymmetric infor-
mation economy, let us consider the following two examples13.
Example 6.2 Consider an economy with two agents, three equally probable states
of nature, denoted by a, b and c, and one good per state denoted by x. The primitives
of the economy are given as follows:
u1(;x1) =
p
x1; e1(a;b;c) = (20;20;0); F1 = ffa;bg;fcgg:
u2(;x2) =
p
x2; e2(a;b;c) = (20;0;20); F2 = ffa;cg;fbgg:




Notice that the above allocation is not incentive compatible. Indeed, suppose
that the realized state of nature is a, agent 1 is in the event fa;bg and she re-
ports c, (observe that agent 2 cannot distinguish between a and c). If agent 2
believes that c is the realized state of nature as agent 1 has claimed, then she
gives her ten units. Therefore, the utility of agent 1, when she misreports, is
u1(a;e1(a) + x1(c)   e1(c)) = u1(a;20 + 10   0) =
p
30 which is greater than
u1(a;x1(a)) =
p
20, the utility of agent 1 when she does not misreport. Hence, the
allocation x1(a;b;c) = (20;10;10) and x2(a;b;c) = (20;10;10) is not incentive
compatible. Similarly, one can easily check that when a is the realized state of na-
ture, agent 2 has an incentive to report state b and benet.
13The reader is also referred to Krasa-Yannelis (1994), Koutsougeras-Yannelis (1993) and
Podczeck-Yannelis (2008) for an extensive discussion of the Bayesian incentive compatibility in
asymmetric information economies.
20In order to make sure that the equilibrium contracts are stable, we must insist
on a coalitional denition of incentive compatibility and not an individual one. As
the following example shows, a contract which is individual incentive compatible
may not be coalitional incentive compatible and therefore may not be viable.
Example 6.3 Consider an economy with three agents, two good and three equiprob-
able states of nature 
 = fa;b;cg. The primitives of the economy are given as
follows: for all i = 1;2;3, ui(;xi;yi) =
p
xiyi and
F1 = ffa;b;cgg; e1(a;b;c) = ((15;0);(15;0);(15;0)):
F2 = ffa;bg;fcgg; e2(a;b;c) = ((0;15);(0;15);(0;15)):
F3 = ffag;fbg;fcgg; e3(a;b;c) = ((15;0);(15;0);(15;0)):
Consider the following redistribution of the initial endowments:
x1(a;b;c) = ((8;5);(8;5);(8;13))
x2(a;b;c) = ((7;4);(7;4);(12;1)) (9)
x3(a;b;c) = ((15;6);(15;6);(10;1)):
Notice that the only agent who can misreport either state a or b to agents 1 and
2 is agent 3. Clearly, agent 3 cannot misreport state c since agent 2 would know
it. Thus, agent 3 can only lie if either state a or state b occurs. However, agent 3
has no incentive to misreport since she gets the same consumption in both states a
and b. Hence, the allocation (9) is individual incentive compatible, but we will show
that it is not coalitional incentive compatible. Indeed, if c is the realized state of
nature, agents 2 and 3 have an incentive to cooperate against agent 1 and report b
(notice that agent 1 cannot distinguish between b and c). The coalition S = f2;3g
will now be better o, i.e.,












In Example 6.2 we have constructed an allocation which is Pareto optimal but
it is not individual incentive compatible; while in Example 6.3 we have shown that
21an allocation, which is individual incentive compatible, need not be coalitional in-
centive compatible.
In view of Examples 6.2 and 6.3, it is easy to understand the meaning of Deni-
tion 6.1. An allocation is coalitional incentive compatible if no coalition of agents S
can cheat the complementary coalition (i.e., InS) by misreporting the realized state
of nature and make all its members better o. Notice that condition (i) indicates
that coalition S can only cheat the agents not in S (i.e., I n S) in the states that
the agents in I n S cannot distinguish. If S = fig then the above denition reduces
to individual incentive compatibility.
6.1 Maximin Incentive Compatibility
In this section we will prove that the maximin REE is incentive compatible. To this
end we need the following denition of maximin coalitional incentive compatibility,
which is an extension of the Krasa-Yannelis (1994) denition to incorporate maximin
preferences (see also de Castro-Yannelis (2008)).
Denition 6.4 A feasible allocation x is said to be maximin coalitional incentive
compatible (MCIC) with respect to information structure , if the following does not
hold: there exist a coalition S and two states a and b such that
(i) E
i(a) = E
i(b) for all i = 2 S;
(ii) ui(a;) = ui(b;) for all i = 2 S;
(iii) ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b) 2 I R
`
+ for all i 2 S; and
(iv) u
i
i (a;yi) > u
i
i (a;xi) for all i 2 S;
where for all i 2 S,
() yi(!) =
(
ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b) if ! = a
xi(!) otherwise:
According to the above denition, an allocation is said to be maximin coalitional
incentive compatible if it is not possible for a coalition to misreport the realized state
of nature and have a distinct possibility of making its members better o in terms of
22maximin expected utility. Notice that in addition to Denition 6.1 we require that
agents in the complementary coalition to have the same utility in states a and b that
they cannot distinguish. Obviously, if S = fig then the above denition reduces to
individual incentive compatibility.
Remark 6.5 Example 6.2 shows that whenever agents use the Bayesian expected
utility an allocation may not be incentive compatible. We now show that it is not
the case when agents use the maximin expected utility. Precisely, if agents take
into account the worse possible state that can occur, then the allocation xi(a;b;c) =
(20;10;10) for i = 1;2 in Example 6.2, is maximin incentive compatible. Indeed, if
a is the realized state of nature, agent 1 does not have an incentive to report state
c and benet, because when she misreports she gets:







When agent 1 does not misreport, she gets:







Consequently agent 1 does not gain by misreporting contrary to the subjective
expected utility, as we saw in Example 6.2. Similarly, one can easily check that
agent 2, when a is the realized state of nature, does not have an incentive to report
state b and benet. Indeed, if the realized state of nature is a, agent 2 is in the event
fa;cg. If agent 2 reports the false event fbg then her maximin expected utility does
not increase since
u2(a;y1) = minfu2(a;e2(a) + x2(b))   e2(b);u2(c;x2(c))g = minf
p










Remark 6.6 Condition (ii) of Denition 6.4 does not necessarily mean that for all
i = 2 S and y 2 R`
+, ui(;y) is i-measurable. Indeed it may be the case that there
exists ! 2 Ei(a)nfa;bg such that ui(!;) 6= ui(a;) = ui(b;). Moreover, condition
(ii) is not required for each state, but only for the realized state of nature which
the members of S may misreport. Observe that Denition 6.4 implicity requires
that the members of the coalition S are able to distinguish between a and b; i.e.,
a = 2 Ei(b) for all i 2 S. One could replace condition (i) by Ei(a) = Ei(b) if and
only if i = 2 S.






Proof: Assume, on the contrary, there exist an agent i 2 S and a state !1 2
Ei(a) n fag such that u
i




i (a;yi) = min
!2Ei(a)nfag
fui(a;ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b));ui(!;xi(!))g:
If, ui(a;ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b)) = ui(a;yi(a)) = u
i
i (a;yi), then in particular
ui(a;yi(a))  ui(!1;xi(!1)) = u
i
i (a;xi). This contradicts (iv). On the other hand,
if there exists !2 2 Ei(a)nfag such that ui(!2;xi(!2)) = u
i
i (a;yi), then in partic-
ular u
i
i (a;yi) = ui(!2;xi(!2))  ui(!1;xi(!1)) = u
i
i (a;xi). This again contradicts
(iv). 
6.2 Comparison between maximin CIC and CIC
Proposition 6.8 If x is CIC, then it is also maximin CIC. The converse may not
be true.
Proof: Let x be a CIC and assume on the contrary that there exist a coalition S
and two states a and b such that14
(i) E
Fi(a) = E
Fi(b) for all i = 2 S;
(ii) ui(a;) = ui(b;) for all i = 2 S;
(iii) ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b) 2 I R
`
+ for all i 2 S; and
(iv) ui(a;yi) > ui(a;xi) for all i 2 S;
where for all i 2 S,
14Instead of Fi, we can use any structure i. This means that if in the Denition 6.1 we use i




ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b) if ! = a
xi(!) otherwise:
Notice that from (iv) and Lemma 6.7 it follows that for all i 2 S,
ui(a;ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b)) = ui(a;yi(a))  ui(a;yi) > ui(a;xi) = ui(a;xi(a)):
Hence x is not CIC, which is a contradiction. For the converse, we construct the
following counterexample. Consider the economy, described in Example 6.2, with
two agents, three equally probable states of nature, denoted by a, b and c, and one
good per state denoted by x. Assume that
u1(;x1) =
p
x1; e1(a;b;c) = (20;20;0); F1 = ffa;bg;fcgg:
u2(;x2) =
p




We have already noticed that such an allocation is not Bayesian incentive com-
patible (see Example 6.2), but it is maximin CIC (see Remark 6.5). 
6.3 The Maximin REE is maximin incentive compatible
Proposition 6.9 Any maximin REE is maximin coalitional incentive compatible.
Proof: Let (p;x) be a maximin REE. Since agents take into account the information
generated by the equilibrium price p, the private information of each individual i





Assume on the contrary that (p;x) is not maximin CIC. This means that there exist




Gi(b) for all i = 2 S;
(ii) ui(a;) = ui(b;) for all i = 2 S;
(iii) ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b) 2 I R
`
+ for all i 2 S; and
(iv) u
REE
i (a;yi) > u
REE
i (a;xi) for all i 2 S;
25where for all i 2 S,
yi(!) =
(
ei(a) + xi(b)   ei(b) if ! = a
xi(!) otherwise:
Notice that since (p;x) is a maximin REE, it follows from (iv) that for all i 2 S
there exists a state !i 2 EGi(a) such that
p(!i)  yi(!i) > p(!i)  ei(!i)  p(!i)  xi(!i):
By the denition of yi, it follows that for all i 2 S, !i = a, that is p(a)  yi(a) >
p(a)ei(a), and hence p(a)[xi(b) ei(b)] > 0. Furthermore15, condition (i) implies
that p(a) = p(b) and hence p(b)  xi(b) > p(b)  ei(b). This contradicts the fact that
(p;x) is a maximin REE and therefore xi(b) 2 Bi(b;p(b)). 
Corollary 6.10 Any maximin REE is maximin individual incentive compatible.
Remark 6.11 It should be noted that the maximin REE in Example 3.4 is coali-










1(!2)) = log2+1 < 2 = u1(!1;x1(!1);y1(!1)):









1(!1)) = 2 < 2log2+1 = u1(!2;x1(!2);y1(!2)):
Therefore, the unique maximin REE in Example 3.4 is maximin CIC.
7 Related literature
To the best of our knowledge no universal existence and incentive compatible re-
sults have been obtained for the maximin rational expectations equilibrium. It is
well known by now that the Bayesian REE as formulated by Radner (1979) and
15Notice that for all i, (p)  Gi = Fi _ (p). Thus, for all i, p() is Gi-measurable. Therefore,
condition (i) implies that p(a) = p(b).
26Allen (1981) it only exists generically and it may not be incentive compatible or
ecient.
Condie and Ganguli (2010a, 2010b) obtained results on the generic existence
of fully and partially revealing REE. In particular, Condie and Ganguli consider
a nancial market economy with asymmetric information, where some investors
behave as Bayesian expected utility maximizers and some others as MEU maxi-
mizers. In modeling the asymmetric information, they do not adapt the partition
approach of Radner and Allen and also they consider one good. Their REE notion
has interesting features, i.e., allows simultaneously maximin expected utility and
Bayesian expected utility decision making. However, on the Bayesian side of the
decision making their notion of REE is not consistent with that of Radner (1979)
and Allen (1981) as their allocations need not to be measurable with respect to the
private information of each individual as well as the information that the equilib-
rium prices generate. Nonetheless, by allowing for mixed behavior (Bayesian and
maximin) they are able to obtain generic non revealing and fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium. Although, our results are similar in spirit with the ones
in Condie and Ganguli (2010a, 2010b), they are not directly related to theirs for
several reasons. We follow the Radner and Allen partition approach to model the
asymmetric information and we focus on the universal (not generic) existence of a
maximin REE. Obviously, our notion is dierent than theirs as we do not allow for
any Bayesian behavior. Furthermore, we examine the incentive compatibility and
eciency of our new maximin rational expectations equilibrium notion. It should be
noted that with one good per state the Fi-measurability of allocations is necessary
and sucient for the incentive compatibility (see for example Krasa-Yannelis (1994)
and Glycopantis-Muir-Yannelis (2005)). In view of this result, one can conclude
that the Condie-Ganguli's REE notion need not be incentive compatible, as the
allocations in the Bayesian decision making of their model need not be measurable
with respect to the private information of each individual investor.
Correia da Silva and Herv es Beloso (2009) provide an existence theorem for a
Walrasian equilibrium for an economy with asymmetric information, where agents'
preferences are represented by maximin expected utility functions. Their MEU for-
mulation is in the ex-ante sense. This seems to be the rst application of the MEU to
27the general equilibrium existence problem with asymmetric information. However,
they do not consider the issue of incentive compatibility or the REE notion. Since,
they work with the ex-ante maximin expected utility formulation, their results have
no bearing on ours.
The recent work by Epstein and Schneider (2010) studies the usefulness of ambi-
guity aversion models in nancial markets. Learning models under ambiguity have
been studied by Epstein-Schneider (2007) and Kim-Pesce-Yannelis (2010). Welfare
proprieties of ambiguity aversion are studied by Dana (2004). The above works are
in the spirit of maximin expected utility decision making, but they are not directly
related to ours.
8 Concluding remarks and open questions
We introduced a new rational expectations equilibrium notion which abandons the
Bayesian (subjective expected utility) formulation. Our new rational expectations
equilibrium notion is formulated in terms of the maximin expected utility. In partic-
ular, in our framework agents maximize maximin expected utility instead of Bayesian
expected utility. Furthermore, the resulting equilibrium allocations need not to be
measurable with respect to the private information and the information the equilib-
rium prices have generated as in the case of the Bayesian REE. Our new notion ex-
ists universally (and not generically), it is Pareto ecient and incentive compatible.
These results are false for the Bayesian REE (see Kreps (1977) and Glycopantis-
Yannelis (2005)). It seems to us that the adoption of the maximin expected utility
solves the basic problems that the Bayesian REE notion faces as an equilibrium
notion, i.e., universal existence, eciency and incentive compatibility.
If the intent of the REE is to capture the idea of \good" contracts under asym-
metric information, then clearly the results of this paper suggests that the maximin
REE has appealing properties, i.e., it exists universally under the standard continu-
ity and concavity assumptions, it is ecient and incentive compatible. But why the
Bayesian doesn't have the same properties? Why the Bayesian REE doesn't exist
in the Kreps example and the maximin does? The MEU seems to provide superior
28outcomes for two main reasons.
First, as it is argued in de Castro-Yannelis (2008) the Bayesian expected utility
(EU) preference representation is incomplete, but the MEU is complete. This is
obvious in the Ellsberg experiment where the EU makes the choices of the individ-
uals contradictory, but the MEU forces people to make the right choices. There is
a fundamental incompleteness in the EU which doesn't allow agents to make the
correct choices. This incompleteness is not part of the MEU decision making and
as a consequence the MEU allows agents to reach Pareto superior outcomes.
Second, in the MEU decision making incentive compatibility is in a way inher-
ent in the denition because we take into account the worse possible state that can
occur. In that sense agents cannot be cheated because the decision to take into
account the worse possible state, has already prevented any potential cheating.
In a general equilibrium model with asymmetric information, we think that the
MEU choice does not reect pessimistic behavior, but rather incentive compatible
behavior. If an agent plays against the nature (e.g., Milnor game), since, nature
is not strategic, it makes sense to view the MEU decision making as reecting
pessimistic behavior. However, when you negotiate the terms of a contract under
asymmetric information and the other agents have an incentive to misreport the
state of nature and benet, then the MEU provides a mechanism to prevent others
from cheating you. This in not pessimism, but incentive compatibility. It is exactly
for this reason that the MEU solves the conict between eciency and incentive
compatibility (see for example de Castro-Yannelis (2008)). This conict seems to
be inherent in the Bayesian analysis (see Example 6.2 in Section 6).
We hope that our new formulation of the REE will nd useful applications in
many areas and especially in macroeconomic general equilibrium models.
We conclude this paper with some open questions:
Throughout we have used the assumption that there is a nite number of states.
It is an open question if the main existence theorem can be extended to innitely
29many states of nature of the world and even to an innite dimensional commodity
space. This is also the case for the theorems on incentive compatibility and eciency.
In Glycopantis-Muir-Yannelis (2005) it was shown that the REE is not imple-
mentable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game. We conjec-
ture that a new denition of perfect maximin equilibrium can be introduced, which
will be compatible with the implementation of the maximin REE. What reinforces
this conjecture is the fact that incentive compatible equilibrium notions, i.e., pri-
vate core (Yannelis (1991)) and private value allocations (Krasa-Yannelis (1994))
are implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Since, the maximin REE is
also maximin incentive compatible, we believe that such a conjecture should be true.
It is also of interest to know if the results of this paper could be extended to a
continuum of agents.
Based on the Bayesian expected utility formulation, Sun, Wu and Yannelis (2010)
show that with a continuum of agents, whose private signals are independent con-
ditioned on the macro states of nature, a REE universally exists, it is incentive
compatible and ecient. These results are been obtained by means of the law large
numbers. It is of interest to know if the theorems of this paper can be extended in
such a framework which makes the law of large numbers applicable.
Furthermore, it is of interest to know under what conditions the core-value-
Walras equivalence theorems hold for the maximin expected utility framework.
30A Appendix: Proof of the Auxilary Theorem
A.1 Mathematical preliminaries
A correspondence ' : X ! 2Y is a function from X to the family of all subsets
of Y . A correspondence ' : X ! 2Y is compact-valued (nonempty-valued, convex-
valued) if '(x) is a compact (nonempty, convex) subset of Y for every x 2 X. Let
X and Y be sets. The graph G of a correspondence  : X ! 2Y is the set
Gr = f(x;y) 2 X  Y : y 2 (x)g.
If X and Y are topological spaces,  : X ! 2Y is said to be lower semi
continuous (l.s.c.) if the set fx 2 X : (x) \ V 6= ;g is open in X for every
open subset V of Y . The correspondence  : X ! 2Y is said to be upper semi
continuous (u.s.c.) if the set fx 2 X : (x)  V g is open in X for every
open subset V of Y . It is known that a closed-valued correspondence with compact
Hausdor range space has a closed graph if and only if it is upper hemi continuous.
If (X;) and (Y;) are measurable spaces,  is said to have a measurable
graph if Gr belongs to the product -algebra 
. We are often interested in the
situation where (X;) is a measurable space, Y is a topological space and  = (Y )
is the Borel -algebra of Y . A correspondence  : X ! 2Y from a measurable
space (X;) into a topological space Y is said to be lower measurable if fx 2 X :
(x)\V 6= ;g 2  for every V open in Y . It is known that if the correspondence  is
lower measurable and closed valued, then it has a measurable graph. Furthermore, if
the measure space (X;;) is complete and the correspondence  from (X;;) to
2Y has a measurable graph, then it is lower measurable ( see for example Castaing-
Valadier (1977)).
Let (
;F;) be a measurable space and Y be a separable metric space. From
Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski Measurable Selection Theorem it follows
that if  : 
 ! 2Y is a lower measurable, closed and nonempty-valued correspon-
dence, then there exists a measurable function f : 
 ! Y such that f(!) 2 (!)
for all ! 2 
.
A.2 Proof of the auxiliary theorem
For all i 2 I, let Bi : 
4 ! 2I R`
+ be the random budget set of agent i, dened by
31Bi(!;q) = fxi(!) 2 Xi(!) : q  xi(!)  q  ei(!)g:
Let Di : 
  4 ! 2I R`
+ be the maximin random demand set of agent i, dened
by
Di(!;q) = fxi(!) 2 Bi(!;q) : ui(!;xi(!)) = max
yi2Bi(!;q)
ui(!;yi)g:
Lemma A.1 For each i, Di(;) has a jointly measurable graph, that is





Proof: Since for all i 2 I and ! 2 
, ei(!) is an interior point of Xi(!), it
follows that Bi(!;) is lower hemi continuous. Moreover, it is easy to verify that
Bi(!;) has closed graph, with a compact range space, therefore it is upper hemi
continuous. Consequently, for all i 2 I and ! 2 
, Bi(!;) is continuous. From
Berge's maximum theorem, it follows that for each ! 2 
, Di(!;) is upper semi
continuous with non empty and compact values. Consequently, Di(!;) has closed
graph and since 
 is nite, it follows that it has a jointly measurable graph. That




  4  I R
`
+ : ! 2 






















Finally let W : 
 ! 24 be the (free-disposal) equilibrium correspondence dened
by16




  denotes the negative cone of I R`.
32Since each Di(;) has jointly measurable graph and 
 is nite17, from Castaing-
Valadier (1977, p.80), it follows that Di(;) is jointly lower measurable, and so is
Z(;). Therefore the set B = f(!;q) 2 
  4 : Z(q;!) \ I R`
  6= ;g belongs to
F 
 B(4). Notice that the set B coincides with the graph of the correspondence
W, i.e.,
B = GW = f(!;q) 2 
  4 : q 2 W(!)g:
Hence, GW belongs to F 
 B(4); i.e., W() has a measurable graph, and since 

is complete, it follows from Castaing-Valadier (1977, p.80) that W() is also lower
measurable.
Since for each xed ! 2 
, Di(!;) is upper semi continuous, convex, nonempty
and compact valued, so is Z(!;). Furthermore, for any xed ! 2 
, Z(!;) satises
Walras law, i.e., for all q 2 4 and for every z 2 Z(!;q), q  z  0.
It follows from the Gale-Nikaido-Debreu lemma that, for each xed ! 2 
, W(!)
is nonempty, i.e., W() is a nonempty valued correspondence.
Since for each xed ! 2 
, Z(!;) is upper semi continuous, it follows that the
set fq 2 4 : Z(!;q) \ V 6= ;g is closed for all V closed subset of I R`. Hence for all
! 2 
 the set fq 2 4 : Z(!;q) \ I R`
  6= ;g = W(!) is closed.
Consequently, W() satises the conditions of the Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski
Measurable Selection Theorem and hence it admits a measurable selection. This
means that there exists a F-measurable function p : 
 ! 4 such that p(!) 2
W(!) for all ! 2 
, i.e.,
Z(!;p
(!)) \ I R
`
  6= ; for all ! 2 
:
Notice that this means that:
(10) for all i and !; x














ei(!) for all ! 2 
:
17Since 
 is nite, it follows that (
;F;i) is complete for each i 2 I.
33Consider for all i 2 I, Gi = Fi _ (p). To complete the proof we must show
that (p;x) is a free disposal maximin REE. Clearly, condition (20) above holds and
for each i 2 I and ! 2 
, x
i(!) 2 Bi(!;p(!)). Therefore, all it remains to be
shown is that condition (ii) in Denition 3.3 is satised. Assume to the contrary
that condition (ii) in Denition 3.3 does not hold, then there exist an agent i 2 I,
a state  ! 2 
 and an allocation y 2 LXi such that y 2 B
i ( !;p) and
u
REE










i). This implies that
ui(!;y(!))  u
REE







which contradicts condition (10). Hence, (p;x) is a free disposal maximin REE.

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